Is free will an illusion? Do we have free will to choose our future life experience, or are our lives predetermined somehow? We seem to have the free will to perform trivial tasks like crossing the road or not. We can buy a coffee here or over there, pay for our ticket now or wait for a better deal. But, when it comes to significant life events, perhaps it’s not so cut and dry. Despite our best intentions, stuff happens.

So many elements, ideas, experiences, occurrences and micro-events seem to influence the direction of our lives. So much so that we can never say for sure what makes our lives turn out as they do. Despite forever pondering the question of free will, the answer seems elusive. However, it doesn’t stop us from asking, and in this week’s article, I’m asking. So, are we fooled by the illusion of free will? Are we destined to live out life beyond our own influence, or can we sculpt life by choice?

What is this biological, psychological thing that I think I am? Am I really in control, or is this idea a figment of my colourful imagination? Maybe it's merely a construct of an outward-facing personality that needs to feel in control of a hostile world? Does this “I” that I think I am have free will to choose its direction, or is the environment, or perhaps something else, the director and overseer of my life? Do I make my life, or does my life make me?

Years ago, if I had considered these questions, I would have answered firmly, yes; I am in control. I get to decide what I do from moment to moment. Therefore, I have free will. I can raise my arm or not, smoke cigarettes or give them up (I did give them up – eventually, but it was very difficult). I can decide to train today or not; I can design my life as I wish. Or at least I liked to believe I could, even though results didn't always reflect that belief. Either way, I felt that I was responsible, a free agent in charge of how I reacted to conditions. The notion that external forces determined my life was incompatible with my worldview.

But something gnawed at me. On examining this long-standing question, it has become clear that I don't and can't direct my life the way I want. Because if I could, it would be exactly how I vision it.

A man may be a pessimistic determinist before lunch and an optimistic believer in the will's freedom after it

Aldous Huxley | Author

Planning For A Future That Never Arrives

Every day events seem to be under my control. For example, I can decide that I want to see a band, meet friends and have a few pints. In that way, I can broadly determine my Sunday afternoon. But next week, next month, next year and so on, I cannot dictate. I cannot predict the day that I die or how that eventuality will play out. Although I do accept that I seem to have a certain degree of influence over it. I can jump off a bridge tomorrow at 3pm, for example. In the space between my birth and death, I can influence my general health by making good food and exercise choices. But that too appears of little consequence given the nature of this lottery we often regard life to be.

There seem to be far too many moving parts, most of which I am not aware. They influence the direction of my actions and life experience. My degree of control seems limited. When I make plans for holidays, socialising and so on, there seems to be ease, a naturalness. There's no forcing myself to do what I need to do. Other times, for other larger “goals” there seems to be a different feeling. Writing this article, for example, is difficult, but there's a feeling that it must be done nonetheless. So I do what I need to do, and although not always as efficiently as I'd like, it still gets done. Am I making that decision to do the work or is it being made for me?

I can't tell.

Schopenhauer said; I can do what I will to do, but I cannot determine my will.¹. Now, that seems a little complicated, but I guess what he was saying here is that we can never get to the root of the thing. I can make a decision, but I cannot decide to decide, or decide to decide to decide. No matter how hard I try, I can never lift myself up by my own shirt collars. Nonetheless, the feeling around planning for big-ticket goals seems to be different from everyday events.

A Misunderstanding of Free Will & Determinism

In certain respects, it feels that the illusion of free will is real. It seems that the notion that I can plan my way to a successful and fruitful life is naive. Besides, what is success, and how successful could I feel if it all went according to plan? It would be a little boring if life always turned out according to my exact intent, wouldn't it? Besides, if my every intent, no matter how fleeting, came true, many people would probably be lying dead in dark holes, and I'd be on the run!

I believe we have a distinct misunderstanding of how free will and deterministic forces interact in the production of experience. The predominant rhetoric around the pursuit of goals appears to suggest that we must force ourselves to make change happen. The message suggests that nothing significant will happen on its own – we must make it happen. But Purposeful Accident says different.

Purposeful Accident says we should, first and foremost, do our daily work for its inherent enjoyment. We must relax into the work and let it happen, rather than attempt to bend and force conditions to comply. In this engaged and enthused mode of thought and action, both individual free will and determinate forces can work together to bring about favourable results.

Contrary to this idea that I must make life happen, the more I plan, the less I get the results I want. Planning feels like forcing rather than going with the flow, so these days I mostly take things as they come. This is not to assume a defeatist or fatalist position ². Instead, it's an acceptance that this thing that goes on all around me is far too complex and nuanced for me to control.

If I could design my life down to the end degree, that wouldn't be a life worth living. The enjoyment of life, at least for me, is the element of not knowing. I know there will be experiences that I will enjoy, and there will be those that negatively impact me. But in the same way, I cannot decide to beat my own heart or grow my own hair. I cannot determine my future life in advance, regardless of what I believe about free will.

A man can surely do what he wills to do, but cannot determine what he wills

Arthur Schopenhauer | Philosopher

Neuroscience & The Illusion of Free Will

Neuroscience has brought our understanding of human functioning to an enhanced level of understanding in modern times. Resulting from the findings of neuroscience, some philosophers and scientists suggest that we are fooled by the illusion of free will, that we are not free to choose because our actions are the result of neuronal processes inside the brain. In his essay titled; Is Free Will An Illusion?, ³ John R. Meyer says that if our conscious will is illusory or simply an epiphenomenon, the arguments against free will are, in fact, found to be erroneous. He states that a great deal of scientific evidence suggests that, despite difficulties in explaining free will, we, on the contrary, do not unconsciously cause our actions.

Reductionists are inclined to suggest that you and I are merely a series of non-conscious processes. An elaborate and mindless accident in a universe of accidents. They say that everything in the universe is ultimately knowable, and although we don't know exactly how everything came into being, it's just a matter of time. The universe, to them, and everything in it is a binary system. They contend that consciousness is a neuronal state that is reflected in alertness, with any temporal gap in decision-making processes reflecting deep brain molecular activity. Meyer says; Our experience suggests that our states of mind are not completely determined by neural events. Indeed, material determinism fails to acknowledge the numinous qualities of the mind and thus threatens to change what it means to be human.

Perhaps most interesting about Meyer's essay, is his reference to quantum physics. He discusses what proponents of quantum physics say may be at play at the subatomic level in living organisms. At this level, there is a randomness and probability that allows for the presence of free will in human beings.

[Consciousness] …can hardly be reproduced and do not belong to the category of mechanical things that science can easily investigate

Christophe le Mouël | Theoretical Physicist

Benjamin Libet, in his article for the Journal of Consciousness 1999 ⁴ asked the question; Are freely voluntary acts subject to macrodeterministic laws or can they appear without such constraints, non-determined by natural laws and ‘truly free’? He suggests that under the laws of physical reality, human beings would be reduced to sophisticated automatons with conscious feelings and intentions tacked on as epiphenomena with no causal power and wonders if there is not some aspect of consciousness that acts independently of physical laws.

Libet's experiments have shown that freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in brain states, which he terms “readiness potential” (RP). This electrical change begins 550 ms before the act. Subjects became aware of their intention to act 350–400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. He found, therefore, that the volitional process is initiated unconsciously. But conscious decisions can still control the outcome; it can veto the act. He suggests that free will is not excluded. Libet says his findings constrain our ideas on how free will operates; it would not initiate a voluntary act, but it could control the performance of the act. He also says the experimental findings affect our position on guilt and responsibility.

Christophe le Mouël, in his article examining some of the dominant philosophical and psychological findings on free will ⁵ says the psyche is not just a structure. He continues;

It seems to me that each one of us is constantly asked to make this choice, even though at times it takes a more dramatic turn. These unspoken decisions are highly individual and determine who we are. They can hardly be reproduced and do not belong to the category of mechanical things that science can easily investigate.

I am inclined to agree with him.

Riding A Wave

When I was around 16 or so, I attended a local technical college. Here I learned the basics of electrical science. In one class, the lecturer demonstrated the nature of the frequency of the current waveform on an oscilloscope. He connected the screen to an electrical circuit with a frequency converter. As he varied the frequency, we could see that the general shape of the electrical waveform remained the same. Although its peaks and troughs varied in height and length. There was a rise and a fall of the wave from zero to peak positive, then back to zero and through its negative half cycle. As the frequency altered in the circuit, the incandescent lamp flickered on and off at corresponding rates, remained stable, and turned off completely.

As I contemplated that experiment over the years, it seems that life is just like that, only more complex and subtle. There are ons and there are offs, there are ups and there are downs, there is foreground and background. Instead of one frequency converter altering the pace, height and length of the wave of conscious experience, there is an infinite number. They are perhaps arranged, perhaps in fractals, combining in accordance with resonance to produce the lives we live. We don't have control over all of these inputs, so maybe it's best to just ride the wave.

The Illusion of Free Will & The Surface Level Personality

The differentiation I form between what I call myself, my surface-level personality, and the broader me (of which I often have little present moment awareness) is key to understanding what the true nature of free will is. The typical frame of mind of most human beings is that we are somebody, that we are relevant, important and real, even if that somebody we perceive ourselves to be is self-destructive and lacking self-worth. In other words, I might regard myself as a big-shot businessman, have a big bank account and an inflated idea of myself, or I may be reclusive with an eating disorder, anxious and afraid to leave my house. Either way, I believe myself to be this personality.

In the surface-personality-led state of mind, as I examine the question of free will, I cannot bear the idea that I am not in control, at least to some trivial extent. Even if you consider me dysfunctional, I still can make choices even though I may realise my behaviour is damaging to me, such as that we see in an addict. In many respects, the dysfunctional life of a person reflects the only perceived means of control they have over their existence. That said, our problems arise and we exacerbate them by our efforts to make change happen.

What you do, is what the whole universe is doing at the place you call here and now. The real you is not a puppet which life pushes around – the real deep down you, IS the whole universe.

Alan Watts | Philosopher

Upon examination, it seems that the separate personality that I think I am is an illusion, a psychological construct designed by the unidentifiable self to aid the interaction of the physical being in its physical environment. In reality, I am not separate from everything else. Therefore, genuine free will, the feeling of being in control, is the sense of being at one with our right now experience, no matter what the conditions. Similarly, the deterministic view, the idea that the world pushes me around like a puppet, reflects a personal psychology again, out of synch with our here-and-now reality. The truth of our experience lies instead, perhaps, between these two dichotomous modes of thought.

In both frames of mind, there is a momentum of thought and its corresponding emotional state – a feeling of being in or out of synch with reality. We may find ourselves in negative momentum, experiencing life events that on the surface we say we didn't choose, but in truth, we did choose, we did want. Wanting, being the absence of something, a need which we must satisfy. The idea here is that even though we are not consciously aware of our wants and desires, they will eventually play out in our experience. In Freudian terms, it is the unconscious aspects of the self that determine experience. However, psychoanalysis does offer a way out of this bind. Through language, by way of dialogue, we can expose the deterministic influences of the unconscious and take back control.

Buddhists refer to the conscious and unconscious aspects of the self as Karma, meaning it is your doing. You did it. But when we perceive ourselves as separate from everything else, alone and isolated, responsible on a very superficial level, we can't accept that. When the surface personality leads our thoughts, then we are apt to defend ourselves, or indeed submit to a deterministic and aggressive universe. Likewise, where the personality believes it is in control or should be in control, and things don't go according to plan, we feel we've lost it, we're not up to scratch. Either way, we're in for a fight, either with ourselves or with the world. Ultimately, it's the same thing.

Some Final Thoughts on Free Will

Einstein said that time is an illusion. At a societal level, we do not accept this. We believe our lives are linear and the phenomenon of cause and effect is real. Like balls on a billiard table, if I do this, then that happens. In this simplistic frame of mind, the discussion around free will and determinism has relevance. In the idea that life is only now, that the universe we perceive exists only in the present moment, any argument for free will or determinism evaporates.

However, from my individual experience, I really don't know what's going on. My best guess is that I am something rather than nothing. I seem to have influence over certain things but not over others. I am certain I do not live in a time-based linear reality where some controlling entity pushes the buttons. Instead, it seems that the buttons are pushing themselves. There seems to be a Gestalt aspect to life, and it always seeks balance within the broader framework of who I am. There is momentum in things, and I seem to be riding that momentum. When I try to force it into what it is not, then things don't work out very well.

So my only choice is to get on with it.

Time is an illusion

Albert Einstein | Physicist

In the meantime, circumstances might make me cry or laugh; either way, it doesn't stick around very long. It's constantly changing. Change is the only thing I know is real, and I cannot stop that or slow it down. Instead, I have to flow with it. In all of this change, the “I” that I think I am seems shallow. This process is cyclical and pulsative, and it goes around and around for as long as I am here. It cycles up, and it cycles down, and it seems to have a boundary.

This boundary is breached at times, and after the memory of the event subsides, I appear slightly different. It seems to have gaps too, lulls between good and bad where nothing is happening. Then suddenly something I didn't plan shows up. That's where the joy and the pain are.

The free will versus determinism argument is an argument over who is in control. This moves out from a hierarchical, somewhere-there's-a-big-boss view of existence. What I have found runs contrary to this idea. I have found that life is self-sustaining, self-supporting and always in growth despite our best efforts to effect change.

This is the nature of the wave.

1. Arthur Schopenhauer (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). (2019). Plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved 1 July 2019, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer
2. Fatalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). (2019). Plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved 4 July 2019, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism
3. Meyer, J. R. (2011). Is Free Will an Illusion?. Ethics & Medicine: An International Journal of Bioethics, 27(2).
4. Libet, B. (1999). Do we have free will?. Journal of consciousness studies, 6(8-9), 47-57.
5. le Mouël, C. (2014). Self and the paradox of free will. Psychological Perspectives, 57(1), 25-49.